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~ he Court)

JOHN & JOHN
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v.
MISSISSIPPI

State/Criminal

No. 77-836

Timely

Cert to CA 5 (Coleman, Godbold,
Hill)

UNITED STATES

v.
JOHN & JOHN
1.
same quetion:

Federal/Criminal
SU~MARY:

Timely (by extension)

These two straight-lined cases present the

did the criminal offense committed by two Choctaw

Indians take place in "Indian country" or in a "dependent Indian

-

2.

r ·
.·

community", as those terms are defined i'n 18

u.s.c.

§

1151?

The

answer to that question dictates whether the Indians were

---

'

properly subject to federal or state jurisdiction for their
......._

.........._

offense.

0'!7"'< ............

-~-.......-~-

--

--

In separate decisions, the Miss. S. Ct. and CA 5

reached the same conclusion -- that the state had jurisdiction
and the SG and the Indians seek review here.
2.

FACTS:

Smith John and Harry Smith John, father and

son, are Choctaw Indians who live in what used to be Choctaw
territory in Mississippi.
resps in No. 77-836.

They are appellants in No. 77-575 and

They were charged with the offense of

assault with intent to kill in both federal and state court.
They were convicted in both (but only of the lesser included
offense of assault in federal court), and were sentenced to 90
days in jail and a $300 find in federal court, and to two years
in jail in state court.

They have served their federal sentence,

but not their state sentence.

(The CA

held that the fact

that they had served the federal sentence did not moot the case,
under Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40.)
Whether the federal or state authorities had
jurisdiction over this offense depends on the application of 18

u.s.c.

§§

1151, 1153.

The latter section is the Major Crimes

Act, which makes criminal certain conduct "within the Indian
country", including assault with intent to kill.

Section 1151

defin4es "Indian country" as follows:
• • • (a) all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the

3.

issuance of any patent, and, in6luding
rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the
limits of a state • . • • "
In opposing the assertion of state jurisdiction, the Johns
claimed that they carne under

§

1151; the United States made the

same argument in support of federal jurisdiction in federal
court.

s.

The Miss.

0~

Ct. rejected the argument,

primarily~the

ground that the Choctaw Indian reservation in Mississippi had
been extinguished by the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek in 1830,
and subsequent federal statutes did not change this situation.
CA 5 reached the same conclusion, despite the fact that the Johns
and the United States both argued in support of federal
jurisdiction.
The relevant treaty, statutes, and other federal action
relevant to this problem are as follows:
(1)

1830--Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek.

Choctaws

cede land in Mississippi to the federal government; many of them
move to Oklahoma; others remain in Miss., as state citizens and
on individual parcels of land.
(2)

1918--federal government begins to give financial

and other relief to individual Choctaws in Mississippi, and to
buy land for them.
(3)

1934--Congress enacts Indian Reorganization Act

(IRA), 25 U.S.C.

§§

461-479, which authorized the Secretary of

the Interior (Secretary) to acquire lands "within or without

r ·

4.

existing reservations • • • for the purpose of providing lands
for Indians", id.

§

465, and to "proclaim new Indian reservations

on lands acquired pursuant to .

this Act."

Id

467.

§

The

United States began to buy land for the Mississippi Choctaws
under these provisions.
(4)

1939--Act of June 21, 1939 gave ownership of the

lands mentioned in (2) to the
Choctaws.

u. s.

in trust for the Mississippi

The purpose of this action was to place the lands

already purchased in the same status as land purchased pursuant
to the IRA, so that the Choctaws could organize a tribal
government under 25
(5)
/"'·

u.s.c.

§

476.

1944--Pursuant to the 1939 Act and 25

u.s.c.

§

467,

the Secretary declared that the lands purchased for the
Mississippi Choctaws "are hereby declared to be an Indian
reservation for the benefit of those members of the Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians of one-half or more Indian blood."

In

1945 the Secretary ratified the Constitution and Bylaws of the
Mississippi Choctaws.
The rationale of each of the courts below, in denying
that the Mississippi Choctaw lands constitute "Indian country",
is based on interpretation of all the above actions.
Essentially, the courts held that all the subsequent
congressional activity could not negate the fact that the
Mississippi Choctaws ceased being a tribe, and their land ceased
being a reservation, when the 1830 Treaty was signed.

Subsequent

congressional action could not override that treaty, and in any

5.
event the IRA does not apply to these Indians because they were
not a tribe when the IRA was passed (in 1934); Congress did not
intend to include "emancipated" Indians (i.e., those who no
longer were wards of the federal government but rather were state
citizens) under the IRA; and the subsequent actions in 1939 and
1944 could not change this.

Finally, in buying up land and

giving other relief to the Mississippi Choctaws, Congress did not
intend to reconstitute them a tribe and their land a
reservation.

CA 5 expressly disclaimed reaching the question

whether Congress could reconstitute a tribe, because it concluded
that Congress did not intend to do so.

It noted that a section

of the IRA recognized that the Choctaw Indian Tribe is located in
Oklahoma.

The CA concluded that the 1830 Treaty was not

"amended, modified or abrogated by the . • . Acts of Congress"
referred to above between 1918 and 1939.
Each of the courts below relied on an earlier precedent,
but all the parties seem to agree that the decision of this
question was not necessary to either the earlier state or federal
decision.

(The SG explains that it did not seek cert. from the

earlier CA 5 decision, United States v. State Tax Comm•n, 505
F.2d 633, because the point was not necessary to the decision.)
3.

CONTENTIONS:

(1) The Johns and the SG contend that

the courts below were clearly in error in their conclusion and in
several of its supporting premises.

For example, Congress can

amend a treaty by a later statute, see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S.

553~

Congress can reestablish a defunct tribe (and

6.

( '

indeed this was one of the purposes of the IRA), because of
Congress' plenary power to regulate Indian affairs and its power
to provide federal jurisdiction and guardianship for the
"remnants of an established tribe", see United States v. McGowan,
302 U.S. 535; Congress manifested its intent to do just that
here, through its purchases of land to be held in trust for the
Indians and its other appropriations; and the CA's limiting
construction of the IRA (to apply only to Indians in the
guardian-ward relationship, and not to Indians who had been
"emancipated'' and become state citizens) is not derived from the
language or legislative history of the Act, runs counter to the
canon that statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of
Indians, and conflicts with Maynor v. Morton, 510 F.2d 1254 (CADC
1975).

Finally, state citizenship is not incompatible with

tribal existence and federal guardianship.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164.

~,

McClanahan v.

The SG also cites several

decisions in other CAs in conflict with several of the premises
of the courts below in this case.
(2)

The SG contends that the United States' alternative

contention was not even addressed by the CA, namely, that even if
not a "reservation" under

§

115l(a) the territory now inhabited
1

by the Choctaws is a "dependent Indian community" within the
meaning of

§

115l(b).

See United States v. McGowan, supra) at

538-39.
(3)

The tribe itself, as amicus, adds the contention

that determination of whether the Mississippi

Choctaw~are

a tribe

r

7.

is a political question, as to which the courts below should have
accepted the determination of the Executive, in the form of the
Secretary's proclamation of 1944.
Because the Johns agree with the SG that they are

________

subject
to federal, . not state,
they acquiesce in
__:;.
- - - .jurisdiction,
___.the SG's cert . petn.

~---

·~

Mississippi, as appellee in No. 77-575,

argues that this is not a proper appeal under either§ 1257(1) or

-

(2), and repeats the arguments of the courts below on the merits.
4.

DISCUSSION:

think appellee is right.

As to jurisdiction in N • 77-575, ) I
The Johns contend that the Miss. S. Ct.

upheld the state criminal statute against a federal
constitutional challenge, but they do not specify what the

(
'--

constitutional challenge was, and the only conceivable one would
be the supremacy clause.

They also contend that the state court

invalidated as unconstitutional the IRA and the 1939 Act, but
this is not what happened.

The IRA was found inapplicabl e, and

the 1939 Act simply was construed.

If the Court decides to t a ke

this case, therefore, it should postpone jurisdiction.
On the merits, the Court probably should grant the SG's
petn and consolidate it with the purported appeal.

___,.

The decision s

below are questionable; and although they could be viewed as of
narrow factual importance, they might affect many other tribes,
and they appear to conflict with decisions of this court and
several CAs in interpreting the IRA and other Indian enactments.
Although the same issue is presented in both cases, so
that one conceivably could be held for the other, both should be

8.

taken and consolidated in order to get the views of the federal
government and the State.
There is a response in 77-836, and a motion to dismiss
and an amicus brief in support of the J.S. in 77-836.
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

April 17, 1978

From: Jim Alt
No. 77-575, Smith John v. Mississippi;~
No. 77-836, United States v. Smith John.
These cases, arising out of successive federal and state
prosecutions for the same act, present the question whether the

·-

federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to try crimes
committed by Choctaw Indians on certain land in Mississippi owned
by the United States and denominated an "Indian reservation"
by the Secretary of Interior in 1944.

In No. 77-575, the Mississippi

Supreme Court held that the federal government does not have such
jurisdiction, and in No. 77-836, the Fifth Circuit, per Judge
Coleman (a former governor of Mississippi) reached the same

2.

conclusion.

I think that both courts are wrong.

The statutory framework in which the cases arise is set by
18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 1151.

§ 1153, the "Major Crimes Act,"

provides (emphasis supplied):
"Any Indian who connnits against the person or property
of another Indian or other person . • . ass·a ult with intent
to kill • • • within the Indian country, shall be subject
to the same laws and penalties as all other persons
connnitting any of the above offenses, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States."
§

1151 defines the term "Indian country" as follows:
"[T]he term 'Indian country', as used in this chapter,
means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, . • • (b) all dependent Indian connnunities
within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have
not been extinguished . . • "

The question thus is whether the offense here was connnitted
"within the Indian country" within the meaning of these laws.
In Part I below, I briefly trace the history needed to
understand the case.

In Part II, I evaluate the arguments of

the courts below and the parties here.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CHOCTAW INDIANS.
The Choctaw Indians lived in Mississippi and surrounding
States before the arrival of the white man.

By 1817, when

Mississippi became a State, the pressure was building to move
the Choctaw west.

In 1830, this aim was accomplished in the main

by the signing of the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, 7 Stat. 333.
Under the Treaty, the Choctaw tribe ceded the last 10,500,000

3.

acres of its land in Mississippi to the United States and agreed
to move to land in Oklahoma.

Article XIV of the Treaty, however,

-

allowed those Choctaws who elected to remain in Mississippi to
do so:

"Each Choctaw head of a family being d.esirou:$ to remain
and become a citizen of the State, sh~ll be permitted to
do so • • • andhe or she s ha ll thereupon be entitled to
a re servation of one section of six hundred and forty acres
of land • • • • Persons who claim under this article shall
not lose the privilege of a Choctaw citizen, b~t if they
ever remove are not entitled to any portion of the Choctaw
annuity [provided by other articles of the Treaty]."
In the years immediately following Senate ratification of the Treaty,
about two-thirds of the Mississippi Choctaw removed to Oklahoma.

~

-~ose

~

~ ~

who remained in Mississippi generally fell on hard times.

Most did not receive the land promised to them by the Treaty, see
Choctaw Nation v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 1, 15-16 (1935), and
this Court has said that by 1893 "the full-blood Mississippi
Choctaws were extremely poor, living in unsanitary conditions and
working at manual labor for daily wages.

Their children were not

permitted to attend schools provided for the whites, and they were
denied all social and political privileges.

[T]hey were receiving

neither care nor attention from the Indian Office or the Department
of the Interior;

...

II

Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 379 (1921).

Finally, in 1918, Congress began to take measures to relieve
the plight of the Mississippi Choctaw.

By the Act of May 25, 1918,

40 Stat. 561, 573, Congress appropriated funds
"[f]or the relief of distress among the full-blood Choctaw
Indians of Mississippi, including • • . for the purchase of
lands, including improvements thereon, not exceeding eighty
acres for any one family, for the use and occupancy of said
Indians . • • "

4.

Subsequent appropriations provided for the purchase of more
lands, and most purchases were made in and around seven traditional
Choctaw villages in central Mississippi.

Although these

appropriations acts contemplated that the Choctaw would repay
the money thus spent, this proved to be impossible.
By the Act of June 21, 1939, 53 Stat. 851, Congress directed
that all the lands purchased for the Mississippi Choctaw since
1918 be held by "the United States in trust for such Choctaw
Indians of one-half or more Indian blood, resident in Mississippi,
as shall be designated by the Secretary of the Interior."

The

House Report accompanying this bill states that this provision "will
facilitate matters greatly if the Indians should choose to
organize under Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act [of
1934, which allows tribes residing on reservations to adopt tribal
constitutions], and take over administration of their lands."
H.R. Rep. No. 194, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1939).
In 1944, purportedly acting under § 7 of the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, the Secretary of the Interior issued a Proclamation
stating that all the lands put in trust by the 1939 Act "are
hereby declared to be an Indian reservation for the benefit of
those members of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, of
one-half or more Indian blood, resident in Mississippi and enrolled
at the Choctaw Indian Agency .

"

9 Fed. Reg. 14907 (1944).

In 1945, again purportedly acting pursuant to the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, the Mississippi Choctaw adopted and
the Secretary of the Interior approved a tribal constitution and

5.

by-laws.
In the period from 1918 to the present, the Interior
Department established tribal schools and built a tribal hospital,
jail, and housing for the Mississippi Choctaw.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 8-9.

Brief for Amicus

Until 1968, however,

law enforcement on tribal land was left to county officials.
~~

~

At

that time a tribal court was established, and the United States
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by or

~~nst

Choctaws on Choctaw land until the instant case arose.

We are told that about 3,000 Choctaws live on or near the
reservation involved in these cases.

Roughly 80% of them speak
the Choctaw language as their first language. Id., at 7-8.

The majority of these Choctaw are full-blooded

~ ~

Ind ~ns.

Ibid.

II. ARGUMENTS.

l,A; t,.

·

A.

The defendant in these cases and the United States argue

~~ that the lands held by the United States in trust for the Choctaw

~..t-<-.~re

"Indian country" within both subsection (a) of § 1151, "all

~~~ land within the limits of any Indian reservation,"
·'~

and subsection

_,.. ,,
~ (b), "all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States."

They therefore conclude that the federal government

-----

has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed on these lands

,:=-~~~~~~~~

under § 1153.

CA 5 and the Mississippi Supreme Court took the position that
the Secretary of the Interior exceeded his authority under the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 by declaring the Choctaw lands
to be a "reservation" because "the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 was not intended to apply, and does not apply, to the Mississippi

6.

Choctaws." Pet. for Cert. in No. 77-836, at 19A.

CA 5 in particular

emphasized the fact that from 1830 until at least 1918, the
Choctaw who remained in Mississippi were citizens of the State,
subject to State criminal jurisdiction, and not part of any
organized tribe.

The existence of the Mississippi tribe of

Choctaw was terminated, the court thought, by the 1830 Treaty •
..-1Ebe court also asserted that
with reference to

tri~es

Congress in 1934 was legislating

of Indians, not individual Indians; and

that it "was legislating for Indians in the government-guardianward relationship, and not for long emancipated individuals outside
that relationship." Id., at 20A.
I believe that this is an unduly narrow view of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934.
§

Section 19 of the Act, 25

u.s.c.

479, defines the "Indians" to whom the Act applies as including,

among others, "all • • • persons of one-half or more Indian blood."
The Mississippi Chpctaw plainly are -within this definition.
Section 5 of the Act, 25

-

u.s.c.

§

465, pursuant to which the

Secretary purchased land for the Mississippi Choctaw after 1934,
authorizes the Secretary to acquire land "in the name of the United
States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for
which the land is acquired . • • "

Thus, even if the Choctaw

were not a recognized tribe between 1934 and 1944, the Secretary's
land acquisitions were authorized by law.

Finally, and most

importantly, Section 7 of the Act, 25 U.S.C.

§

467, authorizes

the Secretary "to proclaim new Indian reservations on lands acquired
pursuant to any authority conferred by this Act • • • "

Thus,

7.

I would conclude that the Secretary acted within his authority
under the Act in 1944 when he declared the land held by the United
States in trust for the Mississippi Choctaw a "reservation."
In addition, contemporanous administrative interpretation and
subsequent legislative actions seem

to bear out the notion that

the Mississippi Choctaw are within the class of persons for whose
benefit the 1934 Act was passed.
§

Section 18 of the Act, 25

u.s.c.

478, provided that the Act would not apply to "any reservation

wherein a majority of the adult Indians" voted against it.

Pursuant

to this section, in 1935 the Secretary held an election among
the Mississippi Choctaw in which those persons voted to accept the
Act.

In addition, in 1939, when Congress directed that the Choctaw

land in Mississippi be held in trust by the United States, it
clearly contemplated that the Choctaw would adopt a tribal
constitution under § 16 of the 1934 Act.

See House Report, quoted

at page 4, supra.
Moreover, whether or not the Mississippi Choctaw were a "tribe"
they
in 1939 or 1944,/were recognized) as · such in 1945 when the Secretary
approved their constitution under § 16 of the 1934 Act.

This

Court traditionally has deferred to the executive and legislative
branches' determinations of whether a group of Indians is a "tribe."
See cases cited in Brief for Smith John at 44. Such deference
especially
would be appropriate in this case,/given Congress' apparent
agreement with the Secretary's designation.
B. CAS also suggested that Congress could not have intended
the definition of "Indian country" in § 1151, which was enacted in

8.

1948, to apply to the dispersed tracts of land that make up the
Mississippi Choctaw reservation.
at 5A-8A.

See Pet. for Cert. in No. 77-836,

But CAS did not mention the fact that § 1151 was intended

merely to codif-y this Court's prior decisions defining "Indian
country" for purposes of the Major Crimes Act.
to 18 U.S.C. § 1151.

See Revisor's Note

Those prior cases made it clear that "Indian

country" can include land purchased by the United States upon
which a group of Indians live, whether or not the land has been
denominated a "reservation," United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S.
535 (1938); and that even an individual Indian's allotment may
be "Indian country," United States v. Pelican, 232

u.s.

442 (1914).

Under those decisions, I believe that the Mississippi Choctaw
land would have been considered "Indian country" even without the
enactment of § 1151.

~

C. I must note two arguments that the State does not make,
because they may be raised by other Justices.
be argued

First, it could

~asxxkaXMississippixxSHpxHMHxRaxxxxdidxaxgae

criminal
that Congress did not have the power to pre-empt State/jurisdiction

over the lands here involved without the State's consent.

The

United States, anticipating such an argument, demonstrates that
Congress' power over Indians and its power under the Property
Clause is such that the State's consent is not necessary.
Brief for

u.s.,

at 31-39.

See

Thus, even though . the State admittedly

had jurisdiction over the Mississippi Choctaw from 1830 to 1939,
a reservation of land under the 1934 Act would pre-empt that
jurisdiction.

9.

It also might be argued that the federal jurisdiction under
the Major Crimes Act should be found to be concurrent with State
jurisdiction, rather than exclusive.

The language of the Major

Crimes Act itself seems to B me to preclude such a holding.

In

addition, no other case has found Major Crimes Act jurisdiction
to be concuerent rather than exclusive.

Although the strange

circumstances of this case might militate toward such a finding,
I think it would create more problems than it would solve.

In

particular, it would undercut the tribal court's self-government
function.
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CHAMBERS O F"

.JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 15, 1978

Re:

77-575 - John v. Mississippi
77-836 - United States v. John

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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Please join me.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE

w ...

J . BRENNAN, JR.

June 15, 1978

RE: No. 77-575 John v. Mississippi
No. 77-836 United States v. John
Dear Harry:
I agree.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 15, 1978

Nos. 77-575 & 77-836
John v. Mississippi
Dear Harry,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Blackmun

Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

June 15, 1978

J USTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

77-575 - John v. Mississippi;
77-836 - United States v. John

Dear Harry,
I agree.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Blackrnun
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMI!IERS 0,.

June 16, 1978

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

Nos. 77-575

&

77-836 - John v. Mississippi

Dear Harry:

Please join rre.

...
Sincerely,

;Jfrt·
T.M.

Mr. Justice Blacknu.m

cc:

The Conference

.,

.§tt.p-rtmt <!fltltrl: of tqt J:niltb .§t¢tg
'Jlfagf:ri:nghtn. ~. <.q:. 2!l,?~.;l
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

I

June 16, 1978

Re:

77-575 John v. Mississippi
77-836 United States v. John

Dear Harry:
I join.
Regards,

'•

tffio;;
.·
Mr. Justice B1ackmun
Copies to the Conference
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C HAMBE R S OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 16, 1978

Re:

Nos. 77-757 John v. Mississippi; and United States
v. John

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Sincerely,/

if'

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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